RECENT CASES
EMINENT

DOMAIN-TAKING

IN EXCESS CONDEMNATION
PROCEEDING HELD CONSTITUTIONAL IF SUCH TAKING WAS
JUSTIFIED To AVOID EXCESSIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.

People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Superior Court (Cal. 1968)
The Rodonis owned two parcels of farm land. The northeast
corner of the lower rectangular section touched the southwest
corner of the 54.03 acre upper triangular parcel. The Department
of Public Works built a freeway across the adjoining corners,
taking a tip from each parcel totalling .65 acres of the Rodoni
land. The Department also took the county road which provided
access to the north parcel, thus landlocking the northern parcel.

not drawn to scale
Pursuant to section 104.1 of the Streets and Highways
Code,' the Department sought to condemn not only the .65 acres
but the entire 54.03 acres of the northern parcel. This resulted in
the Rodonis' receiving the value of the land exclusive of
I. CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.1 (West 1956) provides:

Wherever a part of a parcel of land is to be taken for state highway purposes
and the remainder is to be left in such shape or condition as to be of little
value to its owner, or to give rise to claims or litigation concerning severance
or other damage, the department may acquire the whole parcel and may sell
the remainder or may exchange the same for other property needed for state
highway purposes.
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severance damages. In the award of severance damages, the
landowner not only receives the fair market value of the property
being taken but also the appraised damage to the part not being
taken." The Department alleged that the taking and resale of the
54.03 acres would reduce the cost of the freeway. The trial court
held for the Rodonis, stating that to "allow the taking of any
land not physically necessary for the freeway would be a taking
for other than the public use and that if section 104.1 were
construed to allow such a taking it would be unconstitutional."3
The Department petitioned for a writ of mandate compelling
the superior court to proceed with the action to condemn the
54.03 acres, or in the alternative, a writ of prohibition forbidding
the court from enforcing its interlocutory judgment.4 Following a
denial by the District Court of Appeals, 5 the California Supreme
Court granted a writ of mandate. Held: the taking of the 54.03
2. 4 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMIAIN § 14.21 (rev. 3d ed. 1962). Severance
damages may be strictly considered as the loss in value of the remainder due to its
separation from the whole. Partial Taking-Severance Damages and Just Compensation,
34 S. CAL. L. REv. 319, at 324 (196 1). See also I ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 4 (2d ed. 1953). CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1248 (West Supp. 1967)
provides that:
The court . . . must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of
the parties to the proceeding, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
2. Severance damages
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed
by the plaintiff;
See.e.g.. People v. Loop, 127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954). In an eminent
domain proceeding, the state sought to take a triangular parcel on a corner of
defendant's rectangular property for highway purposes. Defendant landowner's expert
witnesses testified that the market value of the two lots (viewed as a unit) was $156,000.
The value of the part remaining after the taking was $I 11,100, and the value of the part
taken was $32,000. Therefore, one witness testified, severance damages were $12,900. Id.
at 789-93, 274 P.2d at 889-92.
3. People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 206, 209-10, 436
P.2d 342, 344, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (1968).
4. Under CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1104 (West Supp. 1968), an alternative writ of
prohibition must order the directed party to either desist or refrain from further
proceedings in the specified action until a subsequent order of the issuing court, and then
to show cause to that court why the directed party should not be absolutely restrained
from further proceedings.
5. People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 173, 178 (1967),
vacated, People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342,
65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968).
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acre parcel was constitutional as long as the trial court found
that the taking was justified to avoid excessive or consequential
damages. People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Superior Court, 68
Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968)
[hereinafter referred to as the Rodoni case].
When a condemnor seeks to condemn more than is actually
needed for an improvement or use, the courts have justified the
excess taking upon one of three theories.' The "remnant" theory
has been employed in cases involving small, odd-shaped
fragments of land which remain after an eminent domain
proceeding. These remnants normally occur in areas where the
land is divided into small parcels, each owned by a separate
individual. The construction of a street may leave parts of each
landowner's land still within his control. These separate
fragments are valueless to the condemnee. Under these
circumstances, the condemnor has been allowed to take the entire
parcel and either use or sell the fragment. Compared to the
insignificant value and size of such remnants the cost of
litigation over the question of damages may be inordinately high
and can be avoided by the taking of the remnants. It has been
stated that "if the owner insists upon keeping what is left of his
land, grave constitutional difficulties would be encountered if it
was attempted to compel him to part with it."'
A second theory, "recoupment," has been employed to
justify the taking of excess property which is not essential to the
intended improvement, but which has increased in value due to
the improvement. The condemnor may sell the excess at a higher
price, thus recouping part of the cost of construction of the
improvement.' This "recoupment" theory has encountered great
6. 2 NicHoLs, THE LAW Or EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.5122 (rev. 3d ed. 1963); see
also Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 297, 301 (1966).
7. 2 NicHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.5122 [1] (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
New Jersey has a statute similar to California's Streets and Highways Code § 104.1

allowing a taking even though the fragment "isnot needed for the right-of-way proper
but only if the portion outside the normal right-of-way is landlocked or is so situated that
the cost of acquisition to the State will be practically equivalent to the total value of the
whole parcel of land ...... N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27: 7A-4.1 (1966). In State exrel. State

Highway Commissioner v. Buck, 226 A.2d 840 (N.J. 1967), an eminent domain
proceeding took an 80' by 574.13' borderline strip abutting another portion of land which
was taken but uncontested. The value of both parcels was $46,000, while the value of the
uncontested parcel was $45,000. This taking was held to be in the public interest, Id. at
841-42.
8. 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.5122 [3] (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
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resistance and gained little acceptance due to charges that such a
taking of private property would be intended for a non-public
use, and therefore would be unconstitutional.10
The "protective" theory has justified the excess taking of
9. Id. See e.g., City of Cincinnatti v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (1929), where the city
sought under Article XVIII, § 10 (1912) of the Ohio Constitution to condemn the Vester
lot which was not contiguous to the intended 25 foot highway strip. The city stated that
the "increase in value of the properties in question which may accrue by reason of the
improvement contemplated . . .' will pay in part the very heavy expense to which the
City will be put in effecting the improvement."' 281 U.S. 439, 443-44 (1930). The Circuit
Court of Appeals held that such a taking was not for a public use and disapproved the
recoupment theory, stating that if the city's purpose was as it contended, i.e., "that
property may be taken for the purpose of selling it at a profit and paying for the
improvement, it is clearly invalid." 33 F.2d at 245. While affirming the Circuit Court's
decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the city's proceedings for excess
condemnation were not in conformance with pertinent state law, and specifically refused
to pass upon the recoupment theory. 281 U.S. at 449 (1930). Accord, 'Opinion of the
Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910), where the legislature wished to lay out a
street and condemn any excess land reasonably necessary with the aim of reselling or
leasing the excess lands to private individuals. Restrictive covenants would be placed
upon any sales with the avowed purpose of building up Boston's foreign commerce. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that -[i]t is plain that a use of the property to
obtain the possible income or profit that might enure to the city from the ownership and
control of it would not be a public use . . . .Such proceedings are entirely outside the
functions of a State or of any subdivision of a State." Id. at 610, 91 N.E. at 407.
10. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § I; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14. A
distinction has been made where the excess property may be sold when such excess is no
longer needed for the intended improvement. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in the
same year as Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405, held that a statute
allowing a transit commission to take a fee interest and to later sell, remove or lease the
buildings when they were no longer needed in order to construct a tunnel, was
constitutional. The court stated in City of Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. 82, 91 N.E. 1014
(1910) that:
Ifthe construction of the tunnel . . . would necessarily have a directly
injurious effect upon land outside of the limits of the tunnel, so as to subject
the city to a substantial claim for damages on that account, itmight be
reasonable and proper for the commission to take the land infee and pay for
it,
and then, when the work was ended, to dispose of that part which was no
longer needed.
The Legislature well might provide for a taking of land and a
construction of the work with a reasonable regard to economy, and a taking
in feeof adjacent land likely to be seriously injured in the progress of the
work might be more economical than a taking only of that which would be
needed permanently.
Id. at 89, 91 N.E. at 1016. In view of what the same justices previously said, supra note
9, thisisa perplexing analysis and has been distinguished as a taking necessary during
the course of a public work. 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DONlAIN § 7.223 [I]
(rev. 3d ed. 1963). On the other hand, there issome recognition that the recoupment
theory can be more liberally construed. See Bond v. Baltimore, 116 Md.683, 82 A. 978
(1911); and Nelson, An Expanded Use oJ Excess Condemnation, 21 U. PiTT. L. REV. 60
(1959).
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land adjoining a particular public improvement in order to
assure that the area surrounding the improvement presents a
desirable appearance." Under this theory, which has found
legislative and judicial acceptance in California' 2 and other
jurisdictions,'3 the condemnor may either retain the excess land
or sell it, attaching to the sale any restrictions that could
perpetuate the "protective" aspect of the land."
The court in the instant case used the remnant theory as a
basis for its decision. Mr. Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the
majority, stated that while the parcel of 54 landlocked acres was
not a physical remnant, it qualified as a "financial" remnant.'5
It was a financial remnant because the severance damages
suffered by the 54 acres as a landlocked parcel might equal its
value. 6 The justification for such an inordinately large taking of
excess property was that there "is no reason to restrict this theory
[remnant] to the taking of parcels negligible in size and refuse to
apply it to parcels negligible in value.' ' 7 The Rodonis claimed
II. This often not only preserves the improvement, but also has the effect of
contributing to highway safety, drainage and appearance. See e.g., People ex rel. Dept.
Pub. Wks. v. Lagiss, 223 Cal. App. 2d 23, 40, 35 Cal. Rptr. 554, 565 (1963); Annot., 6
A.L.R.3d 297, 314 (1966).
12. CAL. STs. & H'WAYs CODE § 104.3 (West 1956) provides:
The department may condemn real property or any interest therein for
reservations in and about and along and leading to any state highway or
other public work or improvement constructed or to be constructed by the
department and may, after the establishment, laying out and completion of
such improvement, convey out any such real property or interest therein thus
acquired and not necessary for such improvement with reservations
concerning the future use and occupation of such real property or interest
therein, so as to protect such public work and improvement and its environs
and to preserve the view, appearance, light, air and usefulness of such public
work; provided . . . that when parcels which lie only partially within such
limit of 150 feet are taken, only such portions may be condemned which do
not exceed 200 feet from said closest boundary.
See also People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Lagiss, 223 Cal. App. 2d 23, 35 Cal. Rptr.
554 (1963), where the Department successfully condemned all of defendant's land
although only a portion was necessary for completion of the highway. Any excess land
not necessary for the highway would be conveyed with such reservations as to protect the
highway, its view, appearance, and usefulness.
13. Mo. CoNST. art. I, § 27; N.J. CoNST. art 4, § 6, r 2; OHIo CoNsT. art.
XVIii, § 10.
14. In Clendaniel v. Conrad, 26 Del. (3 Boyce) 549, 83 A. 1036 (1912), a Delaware
law which authorized boulevard corporations to take land, in addition to that needed for
the boulevard right-of-way, for the proper construction and security of the boulevard was
held valid as applied to a strip 200 feet wide for a 30 foot right-of-way.
15. 68 Cal. 2d at 212-13, 436 P.2d at 346, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
16. 68 Cal. 2d at 213, 436 P.2d at 346, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
17. Id.
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that the reasonable market value of their three parcels was
$41,000. The department stated that it would be necessary to

build a 14-foot underpass at a cost of $50,000 in order to
connect the two parcels. Since the Rodonis' farm equipment had
axle widths of 16 feet, there would be an additional cost of
$5,000 to $10,000 to construct an underpass 16 feet in width. 9
Therefore, it would cost the Department less to pay the fair
market value and to take the remnant than to pay the damages
suffered by the Rodonis.

Other California cases which have considered the problem of
excess condemnation have allowed it under certain
circumstances. In People v. Thomas, 20 twenty-three acres of land
were taken under section 103 of the Streets and Highways Code
for the completion of a limited access freeway. However, the

taking of another two acres was justified under section 104.1 of
the same code.2 ' No contention was made as to the necessity or

public interest in what was clearly an excess condemnation, but
the taking could have been justified by the remnant theory since
the two-acre parcel was small and irregular in shape. In Thomas,
two out of twenty-five acres were taken under section 104.1 while
in Rodoni 54 out of 54.65 acres, over eighty times that necessary

for the proposed freeway, were taken and justified under the
"remnant" theory.
Disagreeing with the interpretation given to the remnant
theory, Justice Mosk, in dissent, stated that it would be
understandable to have a taking of 54 acres with a residue of .65
18. Petitioner's Brief for Writ of Mandate, Prohibition or Other Appropriate
Remedy at 3, 21, People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 206, 436
P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968).
19. Id.
20. 108 Cal. App. 2d 832, 239 P.2d 914 (1952).
21. Id.at 836, 239 P.2d at 917. In another case involving § 104.1, the state took
65.8 acres of land under that section although a "comparatively small portion" was
required for the freeway construction. While the parcel was mountainside property which
had value to the owners as a snow skiing and recreational area, they did not contest the
taking of the whole. Rather, the case dealt with proof of value and courtroom
misconduct. People ex rel.
Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Auburn Ski Club, 241 Cal. App. 2d 781,
50 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1966); See also Kern Co. High School Dist. v. McDonald, 180 Cal. 7,
179 P. 180 (1919), where an original taking of a lot 80 feet by 344 feet was amended to
100 feet by 344 feet since the 20 foot difference was "comparatively worthless." If the
excess was not taken, the effect would be to "require the plaintiff to pay practically the
value of the entire one hundred feet of land belonging to the defendants, while . . . it
could acquire only 80 feet thereof." Id. at 16, 179 P. at 185.
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acres, but not the other way around.22 While both opinions note
that the purpose of the taking was not for a public use, but for a
reduction of the cost of the freeway by selling the portion not
needed for freeway purposes, 23 the dissent regards this as
tantamount to the disapproved recoupment theory. 2' This is so
because such a taking, admittedly for a non-public use, as here,
with the intent to resell to private parties, represents an
application of the recoupment theory. The recoupment theory in
this instance may be inapplicable since the value of the excess
was not enhanced by the improvement. However, as Justice
Mosk points out, if the "land is truly of little value, the state
will obtain little return by way of sale," '2 thereby defeating the
express purpose of the Department. In section 104. 1, the
criterion for a taking is that the "remainder is to be left in such
shape or condition as to be of little value to its owner, or to give
rise to claims or litigation concerning severance or other
damage." The court implies that the value to be considered is to
be determined by the state, mentioning that "its value as a
landlocked parcel is such that severance damages might equal its
value." '27 While this view does not state through which party's
eyes the value is to be determined, section 104.1 explicitly makes
the criterion the value with respect to the owner.2 The remnant
theory also intimates that the value of such parcels is to be
2
measured from the property owner's point of view. 1
The most crucial determination in Rodoni was what
constituted a "public use." Any taking of private property which
is intended for a non-public use would run afoul of constitutional
provisions." The majority stated that while the 54.03 acres were
22. 68 Cal. 2d at 218, 436 P.2d at 350, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
23. Id. at 209, 216, 436 P.2d at 344, 349, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 344, 349.
24. Id. at 218-19, 436 P.2d at 350, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
25. Id. at 214 & n.7, 436 P.2d at 347 & n.7, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 347 & n.7.
26. Id. at 219, 436 P.2d at 350, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
27. Id. at 213, 436 P.2d at 346, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
28. CAL. STS. & H'WAYs CODE § 104.1 (West 1956); accord. People v. Lagiss, 160
Cal. App. 2d 28, 324 P.2d 926 (1958), in which the court stated that "If at the trial the
state invokes section 104.1 as justification for the taking of the 'excess' portion, it will
need to show that such portion of defendant's parcel is 'of little value to' him or that
leaving title thereto in him will 'give rise to claims or litigation concerning severance or
other damage.' (citation omitted) Perhaps it would have to prove both." Id. at 35, 324
P.2d at 931.
29. 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.5122 [I] (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
30. U.S. CONST. amends. V. XIV, § I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; 2 NICHOLS, THL
LAW OF E.INENT DOMAIN § 7.5122 [I1] (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
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admittedly unnecessary for the physical construction of the
improvement, "the question of public use turns on a
determination of whether the taking is justified to avoid excessive
severance or consequential damages." 3' Such a holding requires a
broad definition of "public use." In the broad definition which
California has adopted, 32 "public use" is equated with "public
advantage," or "benefit," i.e.,
. . . anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase
the industrial energies, and promote the productive power of
any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the
state, or which leads to the growth of towns . . . manifestly

contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community, and, [gives] the constitution a broad and
comprehensive interpretation.3
Therefore, any prevention of fiscal loss to the state by avoiding
payment of severance damages where they are equal to the
property's value would be a benefit to the state and its citizens.
While the determination as to whether a proposed use is a
constitutionally permitted public use is a judicial one,3 4 the trend
has been towards a more liberal interpretation of these findings 5
The stricter view is to interpret "use" as synonymous with
"employment." Any taking must have been intended to provide
the public with the expected use. After condemnation, both
31. 68 Cal. 2d at 216, 436 P.2d at 348, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
32. In City of Menlo Park v. Artino, 151 Cal. App. 2d 261, 311 P.2d 135 (1957),
the court said that "public use" within the meaning of section 14 of the California
Constitution is a " 'use which concerns the whole community or promotes the general
interest in its relation to any legitimate object of government.' (Bauer v. County of
Ventura, 45 Cal.2d 276 at page 284 [289 P.2d I]." Id. at 269, 311 P.2d at 141; accord,
Univ. of So. California v. Robbins, I Cal. App. 2d 523, 37 P.2d 163, cert. denied, 295
U.S. 738 (1934).
33. 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DONIAIN § 7.2 [2] (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
34. Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 24, 286 P.2d 15, 18 (1955); People v.
Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 340 P.2d 598, 601 (1959).
35. Nelson, An Expanded Use oJ Excess Condemnation. 21 U. PiTT. L. REV. 60

(1959), wherein the author cited various Supreme Court cases (inter alia, Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 [1954], upholding urban redevelopment; United States ex rel. TVA
v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 [1946]) for the proposition that the heretofore disapproved
recoupment theory may now be allowed due to a liberal judicial interpretation of "public
use." With a more liberal view, excess condemnation would be allowed for financial
savings purposes. However, the author further stipulates that "[w]hen the excess
condemnation is solely for economic purposes, the burden should be upon the government
to show that, due to the relation of the public improvement to the excess land, the
exercise of power resulted in a definite financial savings to the public." Id. at 70; see also
2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2 [2] (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
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public or quasi-public agencies must use the land for some direct
service to the public t However, any speculative resale of
property to private purchasers is not a public use.3 The dissent
would substitute "use" for "excessive damages" as the proper
test in excess condemnation cases:
the question of public use or purpose turns on a factual
determination of what the public agency proposes to do wit/
the property alter acquisition
Rodoni has added a new dimension of "financial benefit"
to the remnant theory. It is not clear who is to be "benefited"
by the application of this new financial remnant approach. If the
theory is to be applied in all cases by the Department of Public
Works in order to obtain favorable or reasonable land
settlements it may be regarded as coercive by property owners. If
the purpose of the financial remnant theory is to benefit the
public under a broader definition of "public use," i.e., less
expensive freeway construction, then such a theory has great
validity. The standard under which the theory has been enlarged
is rather ill-defined-the Department may take only to avoid
excessive severance or consequential damages ' In the Rodoni
case, the court decided that since the value of the 54.03 acre
landlocked parcel is such that "severance damages might equal
its value,""4 the taking of the whole was justified. Moreover, the
application of section 104. 1 seems to have been limited to
situations only where severance damages might equal the value of
the landlocked parcel. In such a situation, the Department of
Public Works is confronted by a perplexing problem: if it alleges
that the severance damages are equal to the fair market value of
the parcel, and the court disagrees, then the value which is
argued will remain as the Department's determination of the
36. 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2 [1] (rev. 3d ed. 1963), 26 Ai.
JUR. 2d EiINENT DOMAIN § 27 (1966).
37. See 68 Cal. 2d at 216, 436 P.2d at 349, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 349; see also note 42
htjra. Justice Mosk noted that the state's right-of-way agent, in interpreting § 104.1,
testified that it was his opinion that "'the state would have a right to take as much as
one thousand acres of private property, even though it was not for a public use.'" Id. at
220, 436 P.2d at 351, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 351. This new financial remnant theory based
upon a fear of excessive damages may be considered lacking in definitive standards and
possibly violative of due process. Id.
38. 68 Cal. 2d at 221, 436 P.2d at 352, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
39. Id. at 210, 436 P.2d at 344-45, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
40. Id. at 213, 436 P.2d at 346, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
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value of severance damages to the landlocked parcel. The
landowner is similarly faced with a dilemma: if he decides to
allege low severance damages to refute the Department's
arguments he may be bound to a low assessment of severance
damages. Hopefully, subsequent court decisions will make this
guideline clearer. Until such time, the property owner may be
concerned that if a project is being planned near his land the
whole of his property may be taken in the name of economy.
It is arguable, however, that if the individual landowner
receives fair value for his land he has no cause to complain.
What is at issue between the Department and the landowner is
severance damages. Naturally, the Department would prefer
either to completely eliminate them or pay as little as possible.
The following hypothetical will demonstrate the problem. A
landowner's rectangular parcel is valued at $100,000; one-tenth
of the property, with a fair market value of $10,000, is to be
taken for an intended freeway. Assume that the damages which
will accrue to the remaining nine-tenths is one-half of $90,000, or
$45,000. Thus, the landowner, under normal eminent domain
proceedings, receives damages not only for the part taken, but
also for severance damages. The total for both taking and
damages is $55,000. Disregarding any future uses the landowner
may make of his property that would tend to enhance its value,
it may be argued in some instances (where the property has been
undervalued) that the landowner should not derive a benefit, or
windfall, from the eminent domain proceeding. The landowner is
being paid the fair market value of his property and has no real
standing to demand additional sums under severance damages.
Nevertheless, severance damages are provided by the legislature
and it is within their realm to change the statute if necessary,
Thus, the landowner who is successful in proving severance
damages receives the value of his damages, the value of the lost
property, and also retains what is not taken.
41. It would seem that under the fifth amendment of the Constitution that
compensation is allowed only for property taken. However, an exception has been made
by all federal and state courts when there is only a partial taking. "This is a situation
where a denial of compensation for the resulting severance damages would so shock the
conscience of the courts, that they hold that payment for 'damages to the remainder'
must be made . . . . In these cases compensation for the property taken must include
compensation for 'damages to the remainder.' " I ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW
OF IE'MINENT DOMAIN § 4 at 18 (2d ed. 1953); see also 4 NICHOLS, THf LAW OF EMINENT
DOMIAIN § 14.1[3] at 497-98 (rev. 3d ed. 1962).
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However, if the state wishes to avoid severance damages it
may do so under Rodoni. It is important to note that the court
feared excessive severance damages. It determined that economic
savings to the state should be equated with "public use";
however, if the landowner can prove that the state in fact saves
absolutely nothing by taking the whole (as opposed to taking
part and paying severance damages) then there is no economic
saving, no finding of public use, and no justification for that
taking.
In the above hypothetical, if the state decided to take under
section 104.1 in order to avoid "excess" severance damages, it
would pay the landowner $100,000 and take the whole parcel. At
this point the state would have the one-tenth it needs for
construction and the remaining nine-tenths for which it paid
$90,000. The state may either retain and use the nine-tenths or
sell it to defray cost of the freeway. If the nine-tenths are
retained, the additional property has cost $90,000 extra; no
savings would be realized since severance damages in the
hypothetical were determined to be only $45,000. Therefore,
instead of spending $45,000 for damages the state must pay
$90,000. On the other hand, if the nine-tenths are sold, the state
will have to take into account the fact that the nine-tenths has
been damaged due to the taking of the one-tenth. Now that the
parcel is severed and the remainder has been damaged,
theoretically it is worth only $45,000. When the state gains
$45,000 from resale, it has expended a total of $55,000. Thus,
under both approaches to the hypothetical the state pays exactI,
the same amount and saves nothing. In fact, under the latter
example, additional expenses would be incurred due to the
increased litigation. It seems that Chief Justice Traynor has
limited the scope of such an economic taking. This is so because
the state may not sell the remnant to private individuals for
more than they determined that it was worth-the value of the
whole less the part taken less the damages avoided. To attempt
to sell the remnant for more than it cost to the state would be
tantamount to land speculation, which is clearly

unconstitutional

42

42. In a well-known eminent domain case, the City of Cincinnatti, acting pursuant
to a constitutional provision allowing excess condemnation and the subsequent sale of
that excess with restrictions placed upon it, unsuccessfully tried to acquire excess property
for a widening of a street. The court, speaking of the statute, said "[i]f it means . . .
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RECENT CASES

When it is apparent that there is no economic benefit

derived from the taking of the whole, it becomes a question of
policy whether the individual or the state should have the
remainder. The state may argue that the payment of the whole
allows it to take the whole. The landowner may argue that since
such a taking is of no real economic benefit to the state, with no

resulting public use, he should be allowed to retain his property
and receive severance damages. Whichever way this dispute is
resolved, it seems that Rodoni has allowed the state great leeway
3
in the determination of its future condemnation proceedings.!

PHILIP A. DEMASSA
that the property may be taken for the purpose of selling it at a profit and paying for the
improvement, it is clearly invalid. . . . [and] violates the due process clause of the
Constitution." City of Cincinnatti v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242, 245 (6th Cir. 1929), ajj'd on
other grounds, 281 U.S. 439, 449 (1930); accord, Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass.
607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910).
43. After the Supreme Court allowed the writ of mandate to issue ordering the trial
court to proceed with the Rodoni trial, the action was settled out of court. The Rodonis
settled for $36,000 and retained title to the 54.03 acre parcel. This sum represents the
amount paid for the .65 acre parcel, together with severance damages. Letter from L. M.
Linneman of Linneman, Burgess, Telles & Van Atta, to Mr. Phil DeMassa, March 27,
1969, on file in University of San Diego Law Review office.

